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ENDING INFLATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Richard C. K. Burdekin
*
In the post-1978 reform period the People’s Republic of
China experienced its most serious open inflationary
problems since 1949-1950.  This paper compares the
1949-1950 case to more recent Chinese attempts at
inflation control and considers the role played by
budget deficits, indexation and direct intervention in
commodity markets.  While inflationary problems
subsided by the mid-1990s, continuing deficit-spending
pressures and weaknesses in China’s banking system
still pose a very real danger.  The financial reforms
undertaken in the late 1990s include initiatives
directed at the bad debts accumulated in China’s banks
by loss-making state enterprises.
I. INTRODUCTION
For most of its existence, the People’s Republic of China
has essentially been free of open inflation.  Rigid controls kept
official prices of many goods virtually unchanged for decades
before economic reforms began in 1978.  The government had to
confront upward spikes in inflation in both 1988-1989 and 1993-
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1995, however.  Inflation peaked at over 24% in 1994 before
falling back to single digits in 1996 and less than zero in 1998.
By 1998, the government’s concern had clearly shifted to the
slowing growth rate of the economy and the weaknesses in the
nation’s banking system.  The increased government expenditures
aimed at boosting growth and recapitalizing the banks may lead to
new fiscal strains in the twenty-first century.
II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHINESE INFLATIONARY PRESSURES
High inflations are almost always associated with both rapid
rates of money growth and large budget deficits.  While deficits
that are not monetized need not be as inflationary, the pressures
to at least partially monetize such deficits are often strong --
especially in countries where private financial markets are not
fully developed.
1  Table 1 provides some data on inflation, broad
money (M-2), budget deficits and output in the post-1978 period.
 While M-2 has grown at a double-digit rate in every year, the
inflationary consequences have been damped by two factors.  One
is the boost to money demand arising from rapid real output
growth averaging 9.7% over the 1979-1997 period.  The other is
falling income velocity of circulation as reflected in the rising
share of M-2 in gross national product (GNP).  The near
quadrupling of the M-2/GNP ratio between 1979 and 1997 enabled
the government to obtain substantial seigniorage revenue from
expansion in the real money supply.  Revenue from real currency3
expansion reached an estimated 3.8% of gross domestic product in
1992 (World Bank, 1995, p. 125).
But even in the face of this rising appetite for real money
balances, the rise in M-2 growth to 42.8% in 1993 and 35.1% in
1994 was accompanied by a surge of inflation above the 20%
level.
2  Can budget deficit pressures explain such seemingly-
excessive rates of monetary expansion?  At first glance, the
answer would seem to be no.  Between 1980 and 1996 the budget
deficit, while showing an upward trend after 1985, remained below
4% of GNP.  Even after being adjusted to conform to conventional
western standards,
3 the deficit numbers may still paint a
potentially misleading picture, however.  Account should also be
taken of lending by the central bank, the People’s Bank of China,
for policy purposes (chiefly loans to loss-making state
enterprises) if we are to measure the government’s actual
financing needs.
Although there is no official consolidated budget deficit
data series that incorporates such central bank lending, World
Bank estimates tie the jumps in inflation in 1988 and 1993 to a
near doubling of the consolidated deficit in 1988 and another
sharp jump in 1993.  The World Bank (1995, p. 28) has the
consolidated budget deficit at 6.4% of GNP in 1988 and 8.9% in
1993.  Wong, Heady and Woo (1995, p. 28) give even higher
numbers, suggesting that the consolidated deficit was 7.6% of GNP
in 1988 and rose above 10% of GNP as early as 1990-1991.  The4
World Bank (1995, p. 39) argue that the People’s Bank’s
obligation to finance a persistent CGD [consolidated government
deficit] has caused the repeated buildup of inflationary pressure
in China and accounted for more than two thirds of the annual
growth in reserve money over the 1987-1993 period.  The World
Bank (1995, pp. 53-54) also link recent Chinese inflationary
surges to sharp increases in the People’s Bank’s lending to the
financial system in 1988 and again in 1992.
Even though direct monetization of the official Chinese
budget deficit has been negligible over the 1990s, indirect
monetization funding the off-budget loans encompassed by the
consolidated budget deficit appears to have increased just prior
to the accelerations of inflation in both 1988 and 1993-1994. 
The effects of increased monetization were exacerbated by panic
buying and rising velocity in 1988.  There were also major
administrative price increases during each inflationary episode.
 Prices of pork, vegetables, sugar and eggs were hiked by as much
as 60% in April 1988 while, in 1994, food price inflation was
fueled by a 40% rise in grain procurement prices (see Oppers,
1997, pp. 9-12).  These administrative factors operated in
conjunction with easier monetary policy and heightened deficit-
monetization pressures, however.
Earlier periods of inflationary pressures in the pre-reform
era in 1953, 1956 and 1961 typically were also accompanied by
deterioration in the government’s fiscal position.  While the5
1953 and 1956 episodes were, in part, a manifestation of the
state’s investment and socialization policies, Hsiao (1971, pp.
236-251) points to a significant role played by fiscal factors in
each case.  Hsiao (1971, p. 236) suggests that the inflation rate
in 1953 and 1956 was around 10-15% (counting both open inflation
and estimated repressed inflation).  A more serious upsurge in
inflation occurred in 1961, when a 16.2% retail price increase
was coupled with as much as a 260% increase in free market prices
(see Peebles, 1991, p. 24).
  While basic necessities continued to
be rationed, this surge in free market prices apparently
reflected a deliberate strategy of selling high-price goods in
order to withdraw money from the market (Peebles, 1991, pp. 28-
29).
Underlying inflationary pressures in 1961 reflected
primarily the collapse of industrial and agricultural output in
the aftermath of the failed Great Leap Forward but also followed
large expansion in the size of the state’s budget during 1958-
1960.
4  Moreover, as in the post-reform period, standard budget
deficit figures are understated in that they do not take into
account the use of the People’s Bank as a provider of the state
enterprises working capital needs.  Loans from the People’s Bank
provided 100% of quota working capital from 1959 through July
1961, which relieved the budget of its share of the burden and
thus ensured the appearance of a budgetary surplus by means of6
credit inflation during a period of high fiscal investment
(Hsiao, 1971, p. 78).
The inflationary pressures of the 1950s and early 1960s
occurred at the time when the Chinese economy had already been
largely socialized. Even before that process began, the People’s
Republic was confronted by a rampant inflationary spiral that had
begun under the earlier Nationalist regime. When Mao Tse-Tung
proclaimed the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949,
prices were skyrocketing.  Wholesale prices in Shanghai and
Tianjin doubled in October-November 1949 and there was an overall
140 fold increase in the renminbi money supply between December
1948 and December 1949 (see Burdekin and Wang, 1999).  By March
1950, wholesale prices were more than five times higher than the
October 1949 levels, and more than two hundred times above the
levels reached in June 1949 -- just after Shanghai fell to the
Communists in the final stages of the Chinese Civil War.
The extent of the new government’s fiscal imbalance appears
to have been as striking as the rates of price increase.  While
there was no national budget at this time, Ch'en (1984, p. 77) --
who was in charge of the People's Republic's Committee on
Financial and Economic Affairs in 1949 -- put the budget deficit
at two-thirds of total expenditures.  Ma and Kao (1990, p. 18)
have since estimated that the deficit averaged 47.74% of total
expenditures in 1949.
III. METHODS OF INFLATION CONTROL7
In high inflation cases, the rate of price increase
typically exceeds the rate of money supply growth as individuals
unload the depreciating currency faster and faster, causing the
velocity of circulation to accelerate.  One way to reduce the
turnover of the currency is to offer bank deposit accounts that
are indexed for inflation.  Indexed accounts were first
introduced in 1949 in the aftermath of the flight from the
currency that occurred under the old Nationalist regime.  Under
the parity deposit system introduced by the People's Bank of
China on April 20, 1949, the value of deposits was set in terms
of a commodity unit that conformed to the consumption pattern of
the local population.  This essentially indexed deposits to
commodity prices and appears to have motivated substantial growth
in bank deposits despite continued rapid inflation.  In Tianjin,
for example, the volume of bank deposits in June 1949 stood at
20.8 times the March level (Pien Hsieh Tsu, 1986, p. 81).
5
Indexation of bank deposits was re-introduced in the face of
the near 20% inflation of 1988.  Fears that the government was
about to remove its remaining price controls helped fuel a buying
panic, whereby the public pulled their funds out of the banks and
used the proceeds to stock up on durable goods.  The M-2/GNP
ratio dropped in 1988, after rising in every prior year in the
reform period, and there was also a dramatic fall in China’s
historically high savings rate (see Sung, 1995).  To help combat
this flight from financial assets, the government announced that8
savings deposits of three years or longer maturity would be
eligible for a subsidy interest rate (SIR) based on the
differential between the inflation rate and the interest rate on
three-year savings deposits.
6
The SIR remained in double-digits through the first three
quarters of 1989, peaking at 13.64%.  Adding the SIR to the base
interest rate payable on three-year savings deposits yielded
effective nominal returns above 20% in 1989, thereby keeping real
returns positive despite the presence of 18% inflation.  McKinnon
(1994, p. 453) points to the importance of the 1988-1990
indexation in allowing the Chinese authorities to preserve the
incentives for the nonstate sector in general, and households in
particular, to accumulate monetary assets. Indexed government
bonds with a three-year maturity were also introduced in late
1988.  Had the SIR remained at peak 1989 levels, these bonds
would have yielded nominal returns in excess of 26%.  But, by the
time the indexed bonds matured in 1991-1992, the inflation rate
was below the three-year savings deposit rate of 8.28% and the
SIR was zero.
7
The holders of the indexed bonds would have received only
9.28% in 1991-1992 (the 8.28% savings deposit rate plus 1%) had
the authorities not retroactively hiked the payout to match the
14% coupon paid on the nominal bonds.  This move was followed by
renewed indexation of government bonds in 1993.  But the outcome
was quite different in that inflation was not controlled before9
the bonds matured and actual payouts did exceed 25%.  The March
1996 SIR of 11.29%, for example, coupled with a base rate of
13.96%, yielded a total return of 25.25%.
On April 1, 1996 the authorities announced a permanent end
to the indexation policy.  Nevertheless, the indexed bond issues
formed an integral part not only of the Chinese government’s
anti-inflation program but also of the attempt to replace the
prior system of induced bond subscriptions -- whereby payments
were deducted from salaries and operated like a withholding tax 
-- with voluntary purchases.  With indexation, bond holders now
had a ready-made hedge against inflation, making the bonds a
potentially attractive alternative to simply hoarding durable
goods.  This new policy was accompanied by mushrooming bond
trading volumes (see Burdekin and Hu, 1999). 
More drastic palliatives than indexation were considered as
the gradual removal of price controls was met by run-ups in
commodity prices.  Indeed, the Price Reform Research Group of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Chung Kuo Shê Hui K=ê Hsüeh
Yüan Chia Ko Kai Ko K’o T’i Tsu, 1986, p. 139), called for: (1)
the establishment of a price ceiling/protection price; (2)
organizing a special (procurement) market for trading key
commodities; (3) adjusting demand and supply indirectly via
monetary and fiscal policy; and (4) using state trading companies
to stockpile commodities and release them onto the market.10
Such measures had been adopted in the 1949-1950 period when
state trading units sought to mobilize supplies -- obtained in
the countryside through the tax-in-kind, from the output of state
enterprises, and by purchase of private sector output -- and
release them onto the market in the cities to combat shortages
and offset the successive price jumps that arose there (Burdekin
and Wang, 1999).  Their operations became a key element in the
Communist policy of conducting economic warfare against
speculators (Hsia, 1953) and containing inflation in the cities.
Effective March 10, 1950 the trading companies were re-organized
into a full nationwide system, further boosting their ability to
equilibrate relative prices of commodities over the different
regions and offset any local spikes in price.
While no such widespread intervention has taken place in the
reform era, the authorities have, at times, resorted to
administrative measures of price control.
8  For example, in the
second half of 1995, the municipal government in Chongqing
introduced a set of administrative and economic measures aimed at
reining in the city’s inflation rate (Shih Chieh Jih Pao (World
Daily), 1996).  Chongqing had had the worst inflation performance
in 1994 of all the 35 largest cities in China.  Focusing on basic
foods, the municipal government increased their stocks of grain,
oil and meat and intervened aggressively to offset upward
pressure on the market price of stocked meat.  While these11
measures were accompanied by resumption of a rationing system,
the policy of unleashing a large supply of a key commodity (in
this case, 500 metric tons of stocked meat) onto the market to
drive down urban prices remains very much in line with the 1949-
1950 initiatives.
IV. ENDING INFLATION IN THE POST-REFORM PERIOD 
In 1950, intervention in key commodity markets and
indexation measures were supported by administrative controls
pending the elimination of a major source of the inflationary
pressure -- the government’s own massive budget deficits -- later
in the year (Burdekin and Wang, 1999).  At that time, increased
resort to administrative controls foreshadowed the movement
toward a centrally-planned economy.  In post-1978 China, the
state has proved unable to resist the temptation to, at times,
resort to dictatorial methods in times of crisis.  Periodic
crack-downs on speculative activity continue to occur in China --
albeit in a milder form than in the 1950s.  Edicts against
trading rice futures and government bond futures were implemented
in the midst of the post-1993 upsurge in inflation, for example.
 There is also the Chongqing municipal government’s decision to
supplement market-based intervention in commodity markets with
such administrative measures as a return to a rationing system.
Nevertheless, the current Chinese regime was able to contain
the 1988-1989 and 1993-1995 inflationary upsurges without undoing12
the major thrust of its reforms.  The World Bank (1996, pp. 10-
11) also points out that A1994 and 1995 saw a contraction in
borrowing from the central bank and a shift toward commercial
bank financing, and direct borrowing from the public (using
treasury bonds.)@  This followed the 1994 Budget Law that
prohibits the government from borrowing from the People’s Bank of
China.
9  The budget deficit expanded in the late 1990s, however,
as the government launched a fiscal stimulus program aimed at
combating slowing economic growth.  And the 1999 budget deficit
was expected to rise to nearly double the 1998 deficit of 96
billion yuan (or $11.5 billion).
10
Spending on pump-priming measures was $12 billion in 1998
and approximately $7.2 billion in 1999 -- with government
officials announcing plans to raise such spending back to $12
billion in 2000 (Johnson and Brown, 1999, p. A9).  Such higher
government spending is itself a response to rising unemployment
and weak consumer spending.  And, given that in December 1999
China experienced her 27th consecutive month of declining prices,
inflationary pressures would hardly seem to have been a pressing
concern at the end of the 1990s.  Nevertheless, the government’s
budget deficit and debt levels will be impacted not only by the
stimulus program but also by the reforms of the state-enterprise
sector and the pressing need to recapitalize the state-owned
banks.13
The relationship between inflation and fiscal pressures is
hardly clear from the official budgetary data -- that form the
basis for the budget deficit series provided in Table 1 --
because such data exclude loans by the People’s Bank to the state
enterprises.  As discussed in Section II, it was increased off-
budget loans that apparently fueled rising fiscal pressures at
the time of the 1988 and 1993 inflation jumps (World Bank, 1995).
Such off-budget loans also seem to have been a factor in the pre-
reform period with People’s Bank loans supplying 100% of working
capital needs in the run-up to the 1961 inflation spike (Hsiao,
1971).  While the available data are hardly sufficient to prove
the existence of a causal relationship between fiscal pressures
and inflation in China, history does suggest that the potential
for new fiscal strains should not be taken lightly.14
V. CONFRONTING THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE LATE 1990s
As direct finance from the People’s Bank started to be
replaced by heavy borrowing from state banks, the burden of
supporting the largely-loss-making state enterprise sector fueled
a build up of bad debts in the banking system.  In the second
half of the 1990s the government finally took steps to address
the growing losses in the state enterprises sector and the bad
debt problem in the nation’s banks.  At the 1997 15th Party
Congress, Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced a bold
initiative that provided for the sale (or bankruptcy) of most of
China’s state enterprises.  The authorities targeted 2000-3000
enterprises for bankruptcy, merger or acquisition in 1998 -- a
year when 49% of large and medium-size state enterprises suffered
losses (World Bank, 1999, p. 30).  The layoffs associated with
these moves have led to worker unrest, however, and Kathy Chen
(1997, p. A16) points to a 50% increase in labor protests in
1997.
11  In June 1998 Jiang Zemin gave a speech urging caution in
the sell-off of small state-owned companies, which were perceived
as disturbing the orderly redeployment of laid-off state workers
and harming workers’ interests (World Bank, 1999, p. 31). 
The financial weakness of the state enterprises prior to the
1997 initiative was reflected in an officially-reported ratio of
liabilities to assets that reached 85% in 1995.  And Lardy (1998,
pp. 39-43) argues that this ratio was itself considerably
understated and equivalent to a better than 500% debt-to-equity15
ratio.  The upshot of this is that, as state-owned enterprises
borrowed to the hilt, the state banks that lent them the money
were faced with vast levels of non-recoverable loans.  The
financial burden on the economy arising from the state-owned
enterprises is characterized by Dorn (1998, p. 133) in terms of a
terminal disease that is eating up China’s scarce capital.’ 
Lardy (1999, p. 34) judges that recapitalization of the financial
system would require an injection equal to 25% of total loans
outstanding.  This would represent about $260 billion
constituting an estimated 27% of China’s GDP.  Lau (1999, p. 74)
points out that even the People’s Bank of China’s own estimates
amount to 20% of GDP.
  The Chinese government issued $32.5 billion in bonds in 1998
to help recapitalize the four state-owned banks.  In 1999 the
government  established four financial asset management companies
to purchase and manage bad loans from the state banks.  The first
of these companies, China Cinda Asset Management Company, was
founded on April 20, 1999.  When Cinda takes over a loan the
enterprise in question is to pay dividends to the asset
management company instead of paying interest to the bank.  The
asset management company will then seek to recover the principal
by either an initial public offering or by transferring the
ownership.  In September 1999 Cinda undertook China’s first ever
debt-for-equity swap (Muzi Dailynews, September 11, 1999).16
The system of asset management companies is intended to
strengthen the banks’ balance sheets while also reducing the
state enterprises’ debt burden.  For example, the October 1999
debt-for-equity swap agreement with Zhejiang Chemical Fibre
United Group was to reduce the state-owned enterprise’s debt-
asset ratio from 94.3% to 45% (Muzi Dailynews, October 29, 1999).
It appears, however, that the known bad debt has been compounded
by embezzlement and accounting malpractices both within the state
enterprises and the state banks that provided them with loans. 
According to Deputy Auditor-General Liu Jiayi, two of China’s big
four state commercial banks -- China Construction Bank and the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China -- had overstated their
assets by 200 billion yuan and had built up 200 billion yuan in
off-book assets.  A tenth of reported assets were of poor quality
... (Muzi Dailynews, December 16, 1999).
The irregularities unearthed by the governments auditors are
hardly encouraging news for banks that were already believed to
be carrying non-performing loans equal to as much as ten times
total bank capital and loss reserves (Naughton, 2000, p. 154). 
The reforms aimed at gradually eliminating the burden of the
loss-making state enterprises and employing the new system of
financial management companies to deal with the bad debt problem
are clearly steps in the right direction.  But these reforms
cannot be pursued without continuing economic costs associated17
with layoffs and rising unemployment on the one hand and a rising
debt burden on the other.  As the following observation by the
World Bank (1999, p. 50) implies, there is no doubt that the
reform process stands at a critical stage as China enters the
21st century:
China’s long-term fiscal sustainability is threatened
by the contingent liabilities of the banking sector,
the fiscal obligations arising from reform of state-
owned enterprises and the social security system, and
the unbalanced nature of fiscal relations between the
central government and local governments.  Long-term
sustainability depends upon how the government
addresses these problems.18
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1. For an overview of this issue, and references, see, for
example, Burdekin (1995).
2. Baizhu Chen’s (1997) money demand estimates suggest that
broad money growth should be held to 28-29% in order to keep
inflation below 10% -- assuming a 10% rate of real output
growth.  Interestingly, actual broad money growth exceeded
29% from 1992-1995 before falling back to 25.3% growth in
1996 just as inflation itself returned to single digits.
3. Under the Chinese definition of the deficit, debt issues are
counted as part of total revenue.  For consistency with the
standard western definition of the budget deficit, proceeds
from debt issue must be subtracted from the officially-
stated budget balance (Wong, Heady and Woo, 1995, pp. 23-
25).  This adjustment can only be performed through 1996,
however.  Official data on debt proceeds are no longer given24
in the China Statistical Yearbook -- the 1998 issue merely
offers 1996 data previously reported in the 1997 Yearbook.
4. Imai’s (1994) estimates of repressed inflation over the
1954-1992 period confirm heightened inflationary pressures
in 1956 and 1958-1961 -- although estimated total
inflationary pressure is limited to 2.1% in 1956 and 30.2%
in 1961.  Imai (1994, p. 149) also points to one further
inflationary spell in the pre-reform era that appears to
have been linked to the Cultural Revolution (with total
inflationary pressure peaking at 9.6% in 1968).
5. Moreover, after the parity deposit system was adopted by the
Shanghai authorities on June 14, 1949, bank deposits are
said to have grown much faster than commodity prices over
the July-October 1949 period (Hsia, 1953, p. 61).
6. The price index used to calculate the value of the SIR is an
unpublished Total Commodity Retail Price Index that includes
retail commodities, service products, and producer goods
(see Burdekin and Hu, 1999, for further details).
7. Under the system adopted in China -- contrary to the usual
practice in, for example, Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States -- the inflation compensation payment, if any,
is made at maturity based on the SIR at the end of the
three-year holding period.25
8. Moreover, although the government did not implement the
Price Reform Research Group's proposals, price controls were
kept in place on a sub-set of key commodities such as
cotton, fertilizers, oil and grain.  Higher prices remained
available on the black market, however, and resistance to
government attempts to control China's cotton crop
culminated in a so-called “market rebellion” in Fall 1994
(see Kahn, 1994).
9. The Budget Law has been accompanied by a variety of other
financial reforms that include the creation of three new
“policy banks” and increased autonomy for state commercial
banks (see World Bank, 1996, pp. 25-38).
10.  This estimate was reported on December 9, 1999 in Muzi
Dailynews.
11.  Lau (1999, p. 76) states that layoffs had reduced the
workforce in the state-owned enterprises by a total of 20
million through the end of 1998.26
TABLE 1: Inflation, Money, Budget Deficits and Output in the
 People’s Republic of China, 1979-1998
Rate of  Rate of  Broad     Budget
Growth of Growth of Money         Deficit Rate of
the Consumer Broad Moneyas Share     as Share  Growth of
Price Index(M-2) of GNP     of GNP  Real Output
1979    2.0%   49.2%  33.3%   5.2%     7.6%
1980    6.0   25.9  37.0 3.8     7.8
1981    2.4   18.3  41.4 2.1     4.5
1982    1.9   14.6  43.6 2.2     8.3
1983    1.5   19.7  46.7 2.1    10.5
1984    2.8   32.6  51.7 1.8    14.6
1985    9.3   35.5  54.2 0.8    12.9
1986    6.5   30.2  62.2 2.2     8.5
1987    7.3   25.3  66.6 2.2    11.1
1988   18.8   20.7  64.3 2.5    11.2
1989   18.0   18.7  67.3 2.4     4.3
1990    3.1   28.9  78.9 2.9     3.9
1991    3.4   26.7  85.9 3.4     9.2
1992    6.4   30.8  91.3 3.4    14.2
1993   14.7   42.8 100.5 3.0    13.5
1994   24.1   35.1 100.5 3.8    12.7
1995   17.1   29.5 105.7 3.7    10.5
1996    8.3   25.3 112.6 3.7     9.5
1997    2.8   20.7 125.1   --     8.8
1998   -0.8   14.9    --   --      --
Sources: The consumer price data are from International Financial Statistics, July
1999 (series 64..x) and the 1998 China Statistical Yearbook (Table 9-1) -- with pre-
1985 data are based on the overall retail price index; the money supply data are from
International Financial Statistics, July 1999 and the 1998 International Financial
Statistics Yearbook (sum of series 34 and 35); the ratio of broad money to GNP is
obtained by dividing the money supply data by gross national product in current prices
from the 1998 China Statistical Yearbook (Table 3-1); the budget deficit figures for
1979-1992 (adjusted to conform to conventional western standards) are as given by
Wong, Heady and Woo (1995, p. 24); the 1993-1996 deficit figures are computed by the
author (applying the same method) using data from the 1997 China Statistical Yearbook
(Tables 7-1 and 7-3); and real output growth refers to gross domestic product in 1990
prices from the 1998 International Financial Statistics Yearbook (line 99b.p).